Focused Counterfactuals
Studies in Logic, Vol. 18, No. 3 (2025): 67–95 PII: 16743202(2025)03006729
Da Fan
Abstract. It has long been noticed that focus is able to influence the truth-conditions of counterfactual conditionals. Namely, stressing different parts of a counterfactual leads to distinct interpretations. However, existing theories, such as those by von Fintel and Rooth, fail to adequately account for this phenomenon. In this paper, I exposit the drawbacks of these theories and then propose a novel account, i.e. the Good Question-Answer (GQA) view. The GQA account posits that focus triggers question-answer pairs, and pragmatic pressures concerning the adequacy of such question-answer pairs in contexts are able to affect the truth-conditions of counterfactuals. I also argue for the GQA account by appeal to its theoretical virtues.