

Lyu Cheng's Thoughts on *Hetuvidyā* and Buddhist Argumentation

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Abstract. Studies on Buddhist Logic during the period of the Republic of China have been strongly shaped by the Western logical theories and Japanese *Hetuvidyā* researches that were introduced into China at that time. Unlike most scholars who endorsed the idea that the three-form reasoning (三支论式) of *Hetuvidyā* can be identified with the Aristotelian syllogism, Lyu Cheng has argued that *Hetuvidyā* is indeed a particular kind of Buddhist Logic in the sense of the theory of *Pramāṇa* (量论), which includes studies on the structure and rules, the epistemological foundation and the applications of Buddhist Logic. Lyu Cheng's work has set up a new research paradigm for the study of *Hetuvidyā* that is particularly focused on the logical perspective, and therefore ensured the later developments of Buddhist Logic studies as a discipline. However, since there remains to be a lack of clear conception of logic, Lyu Cheng's research paradigm has left behind many important issues that are in need of further investigation.

1 Introduction

After the Western logical theories and Japanese *Hetuvidyā* studies were both introduced into mainland China, particularly in the period of the Republic of China (1912–1949), Buddhist Logic has gradually become a field of research that is of interest to many Chinese scholars. However, researches on Buddhist logic at that time have also been strongly influenced by the imported logical theories and *Hetuvidyā* studies. During that time, for many scholars, such as Xie Wuliang, Zhang Taiyan, Zhang Shizhao, and Taixu, it is a common view that the three-form reasoning of *Hetuvidyā* (三支论式) is just the same as the Aristotelian syllogism. Specifically, they submit that the notions of Claim (宗)、Cause (因) and Illustration (喻) can simply be identified, respectively, with that of conclusion, minor premise and major premise in a syllogism. Nevertheless, there is also a dissenter, Lyu Cheng (1896–1989), who has strived to argue that *Hetuvidyā* is the study of Buddhist argumentation that has its own distinctiveness when compared with the logic developed in the West. Lyu Cheng establishes his claim mainly by a thorough text study on the classic Buddhism works, including those not only in Chinese, but also in Sanskrit, Tibetan, Pali, Japanese, German and English languages. For example, when analyzing the *Nyāya-bindu* (正

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理-滴论), Lyu Cheng has examined first the original texts in Sanskrit and Tibetan languages, and then he has compared their different translations in Russian, English, Japanese etc. Moreover, in order to get a full and accurate understanding of the classic texts, he also tries to consult extensively the relevant works published by many others, as in his own words, he has to “discern various ideas developed in history”, “refer to important works by foreign scholars”, and “examine different thoughts of contemporaries” ([10], pp. 13–14). As a result, Lyu Cheng has published a number of important works in *Hetuvidyā* studies, and his own account is developed mainly in the works like *The Outlines of Hetuvidyā* (因明纲要), *The Buddhist Logic — On Dharmakīrti's* (法称) *Hetuvidyā studies* (佛家逻辑——法称的因明说), *Hetuvidyā studies in Tibet Area* (西藏所传的因明), and *Lectures on Nyāya praveśa* (因明入正理论讲解). This paper aims to explore in a systematic way Lyu Cheng's thoughts on *Hetuvidyā* studies. I will first examine in section 2 Lyu Cheng's understanding on *Hetuvidyā* in general, and then in section 3 his understanding on Buddhist argumentation in particular. On that basis, in section 4 I will also discuss Lyu Cheng's efforts in establishing *Hetuvidyā* studies as a discipline.

2 Lyu Cheng on *Hetuvidyā*

Reviewing the works published by Lyu Cheng, we can find that his interest in *Hetuvidyā* studies has lasted for about 40 years. Historically, Lyu Cheng has started to teach courses on *Hetuvidyā* since 1923 with his book of *The Outlines of Hetuvidyā*, and his last paper on topics related to *Hetuvidyā* was published in 1961. Lyu Cheng has taken in particular a historical perspective to examine the evolution of the connotation of *Hetuvidyā*. As a result, he has clarified in a better way its relationships with the theory of *Pramāṇa* (量论), Buddhism and Logic, and at last he contended that *Hetuvidyā* is the theory of *Pramāṇa*. According to him, “Buddhist philosophy is in general a theory of knowledge, which includes both the Buddhist principles and the tools for interpreting them.” ([2], p. 364) The study of *Hetuvidyā*, in particular, would consist of three parts: the structure of argumentation and its norm, the epistemological foundation of argumentation, and the practice of argumentation. As he has clarified, “*Hetuvidyā* focuses on justifying and refuting, and explores *Pratyakṣam* (现量) and *Anumāna-pramāṇa* (比量) as the source of reasons in the three-form reasoning. Hence it is not the same as the theory of *Vijñānavāda* (唯识学).” ([10], p. 12) Here it is indicated that Lyu Cheng indeed takes the theory of *Pramāṇa* (量论) to be including epistemological studies on Buddhist argumentation and its applications, and regards it as theoretical tools for Buddhist argumentation practice.

Lyu Cheng submits that the study on the structures and norms of argument in *Hetuvidyā* is focused on the argumentative function of justifying and refuting a proposition. These argument structures and norms were taken as requirements on discourse in the ancient *Hetuvidyā* studies and in some other theories other than Buddhism.

And in *Dinnāga*'s (陈那) early theory, they had also been interpreted as the rules of three-form reasoning and the inference "for others" (为他比量). As Lyu Cheng claims, "*Hetuvidyā* is the study for discerning the things in the world and their underlying principles. It probes into the causes in order to distinguish the true from the false, therefore *Hetuvidyā* has stressed a methodology focusing on investigating the cause.....Unlike many others who simply understand argumentation as a disputation aiming for winning over your opponent, Buddhists have recognized it as a way for gaining wisdom." ([10], p. 9) In particular, for those similar studies conducted by non-Buddhist scholars, Lyu Cheng believes that they should be called the Theory of Causes. It is different from *Hetuvidyā* studies, for only the system of knowledge achieved in Buddhist investigation about the cause could be called *Hetuvidyā*. This idea is indeed in line with the work of *Discourse on the Stages of Yogic Practice* (瑜伽师地论), as he further clarifies, "the logical studies in India is called *Hetuvidyā*, which have long been carried out by philosophical schools other than Buddhists. For example, the School of *Nyāya* (正理派) has also emphasized logical thoughts as the core of their philosophy. Moreover, since *Nyāya* scholars also contended that what is true should be established on sufficient ground, hence they highlighted the investigation on causes, therefore their theory could better be called the Theory of Causes." ([12], p. 177)

According to Lyu Cheng, although the studies on *Hetuvidyā* in India could be roughly divided into five historical periods, the most noticeable developments were stimulated by *Dinnāga* (陈那). *Dinnāga* has substantially developed *Hetuvidyā* into a new form, and now it is common to call the *Hetuvidyā* studies before *Dinnāga* as the ancient *Hetuvidyā*. The ancient *Hetuvidyā* studies normally take the five-form reasoning as its central focus, as is further clarified by Lyu Cheng, "the *Hetuvidyā* studies in its early times stressed an investigation on argumentation, including the conditions and rules of argumentation as its research subjects." ([5], pp. 232–239) For example, in the *Discourse on the Stages of Yogic Practice* the *Hetuvidyā* is mainly a study on discourse: "it concentrates on addressing an issue by seven types of different matters that are pertaining to discourse, and there the application of *Hetuvidyā* is aimed to discern the true from the false, which can only be achieved through thoughtful discourses." ([12], p. 178) However, the representative reasoning in ancient *Hetuvidyā* has been rebuilt by *Dinnāga* into a three-form reasoning, and *Dinnāga* has also formulated the rules pertaining to it. Lyu Cheng examines the three-form reasoning and its corresponding rules in his *The Outlines of Hetuvidyā* and *Lectures on Nyāya-praveśa*. The *Hetuvidyā* studies have continued to be developed by later *Dinnāga*, who has, especially in the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* (集量论), "revised the framework of *Hetuvidyā* in terms of *Pratyakṣam* (现量), the inference 'for one self' (为自比量) and the inference 'for others' (为他比量), in which justifying and refuting propositions are all inferences 'for others'" ([5], pp. 232–239). At last, in a paper titled *On Dharmakīrti's Hetuvidyā Studies*, Lyu Cheng has carefully examined *Dharmakīrti*'s

(法称) contributions in developing *Hetuvidyā*, especially his efforts in reforming the understanding of three-form reasoning.

In several of his works, Lyu Cheng has also probed into the epistemological foundation of argumentation, and reached the conclusion that “it is from the work of *Dinnāga* that the Buddhist study of *Hetuvidyā* has shifted its focus from discourse and then become a study of ‘*Pramāṇa*’. The latter is related to the notion of knowledge, hence it is in many ways epistemological. After that, most scholars in the *Yogacara* School (瑜伽学派) have started to develop their theory of *Vijñānavada* (唯识理论) on the basis of ‘*Pramāṇa*’ studies.” ([3], pp. 199–224) As is further clarified by Lyu Cheng, “the *Yogacara* scholars used to focus their research of *Hetuvidyā* on discourse...for them *Hetuvidyā* was only a study of justifying and refuting propositions...however, it is *Dinnāga* who has broken this restriction and extended the study of *Hetuvidyā* into the full scope of Buddhism, and in such a way *Hetuvidyā* has become a general epistemology for Buddhist philosophy, namely, the theory of ‘*Pramāṇa*’. Then, it is not only useful for guiding discourses, but also helpful in seeking the truth. It will include all the knowledge about how to practice Buddhism, and how to gain wisdom to attain Buddhahood. Accordingly, in *Dinnāga*’s theory, the theory of ‘*Pramāṇa*’ is the prerequisites for attaining Buddhahood, and only when you have finally attained Buddhahood, you can truly know the world and discern the true from the false.” ([12], p. 190)

The followers of *Dharmakīrti* (法称) can be distinguished into three different groups: the school of literal interpretation (释文派), the school of commentators (阐义派) and the third or religious school of commentators (明教派). According to Lyu Cheng, “it can be said that the *Yogacara* school of Buddhism has been reformed in the work of *Dharmakīrti*, in such a way that their studies have since then shifted the focus from the purely *Cittamatra* theorizing (唯识学说) to the justifying of the *Cittamatra* theory by means of the theory of *Pramāṇa*.” ([12], pp. 209–210) Furthermore, “they have also stressed that the knowledge of *Hetuvidyā* is indispensable for all the believers and wise men, for it can improve our thinking, and also help in the understanding of Buddhist doctrines. This view is indeed originated in *Dharmakīrti*’s *Pramāṇa-vartika* (量评释论), which was in turn inherited from *Dinnāga*’s *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* (集量论).” ([4], pp. 276–280) As Lyu Cheng has summarized, “the study of *Hetuvidyā* was originally known for its investigation on the reason (cause) for making a judgment. From the beginning, it focuses particularly on debate and argumentation, with an aim to defend the Buddhist standpoints against the other competing views. Then it has been developed into a form of epistemological study that highlights the acquisition of knowledge, and its normative criteria...Hence from the perspective of *Hetuvidyā*, the process of knowing starts from the *Pratyakṣam*, and it develops out new understanding by means of *Anumāna-pramāṇa*, and aims to reach the highest level of knowledge as in Buddhahood.” ([1], p. 341)

Moreover, Lyu Cheng has also stressed the crucial importance of *Hetuvidyā* for

Buddhism theorizing and Buddhist argumentation. “The Buddhists have to establish their philosophical claims by argumentation, which, in turn, requires a study of persuasive reasons. Accordingly, *Hetuvidyā* is developed out as a particular study on reasons.” ([7], p. 1505) In this connection, the study of *Hetuvidyā* is different from the Buddhist theory and its principles in that it is the methodology for Buddhism. As Lyu Cheng contends, “the study of *Hetuvidyā* originates from the investigation of discourses that are aimed to defend or refute some claim, hence it is closely related to Buddhist argumentation.” ([8], p. 1384) Moreover, “as a distinctive discipline, however, the study of *Hetuvidyā* has also its own theoretical insights that are different from those of Buddhist theory. For example, in the study of *Hetuvidyā*, the notions of individuality and commonality are to be interpreted as some fundamental elements with their own strict and specific definitions: individuality is revealed on the basis of *Pratyakṣam* (现量), while commonality is found by means of *Anumāna-pramāṇa* (比量). Nevertheless, as in Buddhist theory, with the wisdom of Buddhahood there is no sharp distinction between individuality and commonality, and they both fall into the scope of *Pratyakṣam*.” ([8], p. 1385)

To sum up, since the study of *Hetuvidyā* includes as its own integral parts the studies on the structure and norms of argument, the studies on the epistemological foundation and the application of Buddhist argumentation, Lyu Cheng concludes that *Hetuvidyā* is indeed a systematic study of Buddhist logic. To quote his own words, “the study of *Hetuvidyā* is exactly the study of Buddhist logic” ([5], pp. 232–239), and “all the Buddhist logical studies should be called *Hetuvidyā*” ([3], pp. 199–224).

3 Lyu Cheng on Buddhist Argumentation

Lyu Cheng pays close attention to discuss the peculiarities of Buddhist argumentation. In *The Outlines of Hetuvidyā*, based on his reading of *Nyāya-mukha* (因明正理门论) and *Nyāya-praveśa* (因明入正理论), he has provided a general theorizing about Buddhist argumentation. There Lyu Cheng has undertaken a theoretical analysis on the correctness of three-form reasoning, the refutation of fallacious arguments, the inventions of reasons, and also the issues pertaining to the arguer, the purpose of arguing etc.

Basically, Lyu Cheng has focused on studying the rules of three-form reasoning, and used them to evaluate Buddhist argumentation. In order to illustrate his theory, he has offered more than 60 examples of argumentation that are taken from religious contexts including Buddhism. Most examples are taken from the classic works of *Madhyamika* (中观学派) and *Vijñānavada* (唯识学派) schools, and many of these examples are cited for their being conforming or violating the rules of three-form reasoning. In general, Lyu Cheng has proposed an eight-step method for determining the correctness of Buddhist argumentation. The first step is to check whether the claim to be argued is exactly the point defended by the proponent but disapproved by

the opponent, otherwise it cannot meet the requirement that the claim to be argued must be a disagreement. The second step is to check whether it is a complete three-form reasoning, for none of its elements is allowed to be missing. The third step is to determine whether it is arguing for or against a claim, while the fourth is to check whether all the concepts used in the argument are well accepted by both the proponent and opponent, for otherwise the reasons adduced in the argument would deem to be unacceptable. Lyu Cheng has asserted that “the three-form reasoning is used by all participants in the argumentation, where the proponent should try to argue for his own position based on claims that are accepted by both the proponents and opponent. Accordingly, the correctness of reasoning is also related to their common consensus.” ([10], p. 16) The fifth step, according to Lyu Cheng, is to examine whether the claim to be argued is incorrect in some other ways, and the sixth step is to examine carefully the correctness of reasons adduced in the argument. Then, the seventh step is to look into the support offered by reasons to the conclusion, and the last step is an overall judgment made on the correctness of the argument. In particular, Lyu Cheng has illustrated this method in more detail with an example borrowed from the works of *Madhyamika* on truth and falsity ([10], pp. 55–57), and in his analysis, that argument is fallacious because five faults can be detected in these eight steps. Moreover, in *The Outlines of Hetuvidyā*, 11 examples are cited for illustrating the examination of the claim to be argued, 13 examples for that of reason, 9 examples for the support offered by reasons, and there are also 11 examples for the application of three-form reasoning, 18 examples of effective refutation and 2 examples of fallacious refutation. Here it is particularly worth noting that it is indeed Lyu Cheng’s own intention to use exclusively Buddhist argumentation examples in his analysis. He does not explain any of his ideas with an illustration of any arguments in ordinary life, for he truly believes that the rules and criteria in *Hetuvidyā* are only applicable to Buddhist argumentation. According to Lyu Cheng, they are not as universal as the rules of syllogism.

Moreover, Lyu Cheng has also exerted considerable efforts to discuss the application of *Hetuvidyā* knowledge in analyzing and resolving the controversies over the proof of idealism (唯识比量). In the *Yinminggruzhenglilunshu* (因明入正理论疏), Kuiji (窥基) has divided the notion of *Anumāna-pramāṇa* (比量) into three different types, depending on whether the starting points used in the argument are accepted by the proponent, by the opponent or by both. In particular, Kuiji has distinguished inferences based on the proponent’s starting points, inferences based on the opponent’s starting points, and inferences based on common starting points, and he has also formulated their corresponding rules respectively. On that basis, Kuiji contends that the proof of idealism is indeed a form of inference based on common starting points, for all the concepts used in the claims of the proof are commonly recognized by both the proponent and the opponent. However, Kuiji’s position is not convincing to all the later scholars who are interested in analyzing the proof of idealism, hence there is often controversy over the logical adequacy of the proof. Some scholars claimed that

it is indeed fallacious, some believed that it is correct, and there are still others who submitted that its correctness can not be judged from the logical point of view. In this context, Lyu Cheng has used rules of three-form reasoning to examine the proof of idealism, and contended that it is correct because it indeed conforms to all rules of three-form reasoning (see [11, p. 268]). Another case is the analysis of *zhangzhen biliang* (掌珍比量) by Lyu Cheng. The *zhangzhen biliang* is derived from the *Dacheng zhangzhen lun* (大乘掌珍论), which was put forward by *Bhavaviveka* (清辨) and aimed at denying the reality beneath all things (诸法有相) of *Dharmapala* (护法). However, since Xuanzang, scholars have held different views on the *zhangzhen biliang*. According to the rule of the three-form reasoning, Lyu Cheng believes the Claim to be erroneous, the proponent and opponent have a different understanding of the concepts used in the Claim. And Claim was meant to make for others, if the Claim is not *saṃvṛti-satya* (世俗谛), it would be difficult to achieve the goal of making others understand. Therefore, Lyu Cheng thought that the *Pramāṇa* which is set up in *zhangzhen biliang* is fallacious. Disapproval of Lyu Cheng's views are later expressed by many scholars, such as Wang Enyang and Taixu (太虚). According to Wang Enyang, Lyu Cheng is definitely wrong to criticize those arguments as being invalid, for the analysis and evaluation of Buddhist argumentation have to be located within the particular Buddhist theories in which they are put to use, hence their conforming to the rules of three-form reasoning only plays a secondary role ([13], pp. 284–287). While for Taixu, it is believed that the *Madhyamika* (中观学) and *Vijñānavada* (唯识学) schools are similar in their theorizing, hence if the proof of idealism is regarded by Lyu Cheng as conforming to the rules of three-form reasoning, the same judgment should be passed on the argument in *Madhyamika* theory ([9], pp. 389–390). Here clearly the controversy is indeed caused by their disagreements on topics like what are the specific norms for evaluating Buddhist argumentation, and how they could be properly used in the Buddhism contexts.

When reviewing the examples collected in *The Outlines of Hetuvidyā*, and his specific study on the proof of idealism, we can find it clear that Lyu Cheng has focused particularly on Buddhist argumentation in his study of *Hetuvidyā*, attempting to substantiate the view that *Hetuvidyā* is indeed the tools for Buddhist argumentation. As is clarified by himself “*Hetuvidyā* is a theoretical tool for Buddhist theorizing, just as in *Vasubandhu*'s (世亲) later work, it can be used to clear up the misconceptions and resolving the disagreement.” ([12], p. 179)

4 Lyu Cheng on the discipline of Buddhist Logic

Lyu Cheng has made great effort to establish Buddhist Logic as a discipline. For the first, he has tried to argue that studies in Buddhist Logic has not only a logical nature, but also its own Buddhist particularity. Accordingly, he has borrowed many notions from Western logic, such as syllogism, middle term, categorical proposition, the

law of contradiction and that of the excluded middle, in order to conduct a comparative analysis on *Hetuvidyā*. For example, he explains that “two three-form reasonings will conflict with each other (相违决定) if they are used to argue respectively for two contradictory claims. Committing to this error is just like being faulty of violating the law of contradiction or the law of excluded middle.” ([11], p. 233) When explaining the structure of three-form reasoning, he also comments that “while the syllogism in Formal Logic is a form of deductive reasoning, the three-form reasoning in *Hetuvidyā* is more of an inductive nature. Accordingly, we can find that they are different not only in their reasoning forms, but also in their contents. For example, in the studies of Formal Logic, in case of a syllogism which has an universal affirmative proposition as its premise, its conclusion is just included in its premise... However, for the three-form reasoning, universal propositions will normally take the form of a hypothetical judgment such as ‘if it is artificial then it will not be eternal’, and their function would in turn be more flexible. Besides, the use of three-form reasoning will also require an illustration with examples, hence include in it a mechanism of induction.” ([11], pp. 248–249) Moreover, as Lyu Cheng has analyzed, “in the study of Formal Logic there is a notion of middle term, which appears in both premises of a syllogism. And it is a rule for valid syllogisms that the middle term must be distributed at least once in these premises. But there is no such rules in *Hetuvidyā*. Instead, normally two examples (one of them being a counter-example) are used in *Hetuvidyā* as a means to judge the validity of argument, which can likewise help us to reach a right verdict.” ([11], p. 315) Based on these comparative illustrations, it is quite obvious to see that Lyu Cheng is trying to reveal the similarity and difference between Western Logic and *Hetuvidyā*. Besides, he has also offered a discussion focusing on the different conceptions of Truth in those two disciplines: “the notion of Truth in Buddhism refers to the Good in the moral sense, thus in Buddhist studies the distinction between the truth and falsity is closely related to a discrimination of being good from being evil. In other words, the Buddhist notion of truth should be conceived fundamentally from a moral point of view.” ([12], p. 232) Consequently, the Buddhist argumentation that are built upon such a conception of truth would also be characteristically different.

For the second, Lyu Cheng has well distinguished the Buddhist Logic from the theory of Buddhism, just as the Chinese Logic is different from the Chinese philosophy in general. In particular, he regards *Hetuvidyā* to be the prerequisites that are necessary and contributory for attaining Buddhahood. Accordingly to him, the learning of the theory of Buddhism would go through three stages, in which the second one is “the transforming into a believer, where we aim to attain the enlightenment of Buddhahood, by seeking to the good and avoiding the evil deeds. However, this transformation is very difficult, hence two more books can be recommended for some help. The first one will be the book of *Nyāya-praveśa* (因明入正理论), for the knowledge of *Hetuvidyā* is widely used for guiding discussion and thinking, and it is especially important for the latter. Through discussions, we can understand the others, but by

the way of thinking, we can reflect on our own, as the Confucians have realized, the gains come from thinking. Accordingly, the learning of *Hetuvidyā* is necessary, and when following the rules of *Hetuvidyā*, we can better understand both ourselves and the others, by doing half the work while getting double the result.” ([6], p. 628)

The third stage, as identified by Lyu Cheng in the learning of Buddhism, is “to understand the conditions under which the attaining of Buddhahood becomes possible. And here again two books can be recommended for offering some help. The first one is *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* (集量论), a collection of works authored by *Dinnāga*. The book deals extensively with the studies in *Hetuvidyā*, but the discussions in the book are indeed conducive for explaining the Buddhism theory. *Dinnāga* actually takes the knowledge of *Hetuvidyā* as indispensable to the interpretation of Buddhism theory, hence the book should not be regarded as a treatise simply on *Hetuvidyā*. In particular, the method of three-form reasoning has been elaborated in the book, which...should also be used continuously in the learning of Buddhism.” ([6], p. 641)

In general, Lyu Cheng takes *Hetuvidyā* to be the theory of *Pramāṇa* (量论), and regards it as Buddhist Logic. There are *Pratyakṣam* (现量) and *Anumāna-pramāṇa* (比量), in which “*Anumāna-pramāṇa* involves the use of concept, while *Pratyakṣam* does no.” ([12], p. 191) More specifically, the inference “for one self” (为自比量) and the inference “for others” (为他比量) need to be distinguished, with the former “refers to the thinking methods we used to know things...[but the latter] refers to the language expressions we used to pass our knowledge to the others, or to construct arguments for our own positions.” ([12], p. 208) However, although Lyu Cheng has contended that Buddhist Logic is a type of logic, he does not pay much attention to reveal the general scope and the characteristic features of logical studies including buddhist logic. This leads to, consequently, sharp disagreements in the later studies on Buddhist argumentation. This failure can be evidenced clearly by his critical discussion on two Buddhist argumentations (二量) in the *Dacheng zhangzhen lun* (大乘掌珍论), which are significant in *Madhyamika* (中观学) and also in the format of three-form reasoning.

Hence it can be seen that Lyu Cheng’s efforts in establishing the discipline of Buddhist Logic are not completely successful, leaving behind many issues that need to be further explored. For example, there remains to be several significant differences between a three-form reasoning and a syllogism: the claim to be argued in the former is always given in advance, while in the latter it is implied by necessity; the reasons adduced in a three-form reasoning have to be a common ground between the proponent and the opponent; and the use of a three-form reasoning will always involve a concern of the arguer, hence it can hardly be abstracted into an impersonal formal structure. Moreover, the classic works of *Pramāṇa* discuss not only the structure and rules of three-form reasoning, but also the concrete Buddhist argumentative practices. Therefore, when the study of *Hetuvidyā* is conceived, as proposed by Lyu Cheng, to be the theory of *Pramāṇa*, it will for sure broaden the scope of *Hetuvidyā*

studies, and it will also renew our understanding about the nature and the function of *Hetuvidyā* studies. In particular, it would be improper to interpret the Buddhist logic in terms of the notions like deduction or induction, rather, the study of Buddhist logic will have to be located in the context of Buddhist argumentative practices.

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吕澂论因明与佛学论证

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摘 要

西方逻辑学传播和从日本输入因明后的直接影响是在民国时期出现佛教逻辑研究,最明显的表现是大多研究者形成因明的三支论式与亚里士多德三段论的一致性的观念,即新因明结构宗、因、喻分别对应三段论结论、小前提、大前提。吕澂则从历时性角度,站在法称量论理论框架下,研究因明的内容,认为因明等同于量论,包含论证结构及其规则、论证的认识论基础和论证在佛学中运用三部分内容,这就是佛家逻辑。吕澂的研究是因明创新研究的一个范例,是对窥基因明研究的一种逻辑转向,助益于当今佛教逻辑学科建设,但是,基于包含佛教逻辑在内的逻辑边界,吕澂并没有清晰的回答,使得在佛学论证中各持己说,这是吕澂给我们留下来研究的课题。