Causation as a Tool or Causation as a Target——The Analysis of Pearl’s and Lewis’ Theory of Causation

Studies in Logic, Vol. 15, No. 6 (2022): 49–65   PII: 1674­3202(2022)­06­0049­17

Zhanglyu Li   Shangcheng Tang

Abstract.

Judea Pearl’s and David Lewis’ theory of causation both hold important positions in the field of causation studies, but it seems their difference and applicability still need to be compared and discussed. Using Pearl’s Logic of Structure­Based Counterfactuals, we analyze the three predicaments Lewis’ theory of causation encountered, i.e. pre­emption, epiphenomena and cause­effect inversion, and show these problems can be answered easily with Pearl’s theory. This “easy answer” reveals the logic preferences of the two theories: Pearl believes “the truth value doesn’t influence the causal relation”, but Lewis insists “the truth value do change the causal relation”. Their logical preferences explain the major difference between Pearl’s and Lewis’ theory of causation: causation as a tool or causation as a target. Pearl’s theory is more efficient to deal with the “tool­style” problems, which treats causation as a presupposed structure; while Lewis’ theory is more suitable for “target­style” problems, which reject causation as an initial concept and try to find its metaphysical grounding.