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Studies in Logic
2021 Vol.14 Issue.5
Published 2021-10-18

1 Private Belief Update in Awareness Logic
Pengfei Song; Wei Xiong
Based on Doxastic Attitude Logic with Awareness, this article studies an extension with private update operator, presents an axiomatization of this extension, and proves soundness and completeness of it with respect to multi-agent belief base models with awareness. Moreover, we compare the private belief base expansion in our logic and the private arrow update in Propositional Awareness Logic, and prove a bisimulation result between two models generated by the two kinds of updates.
2021 Vol. 14 (5): 1-22 [Abstract] ( 0 ) [HTML 1KB] [ PDF 371KB] ( 34 )
23 Analysing Monty Hall Problem with Probabilistic Dynamic Epistemic Logic
Zhanglv Li; Yixin Pan
Monty Hall problem is a counterintuitive problem of probability, which is a hot issue of many fields like Logic, Mathematics, Psychology, Economics and Computer Science. PDEL (Probabilistic Dynamic Epistemic Logic) is a latest logic theory, which combines Probabilistic Logic with Dynamic Epistemic Logic, and treats the probability of an event as the probability of a world in the epistemic model, showing the probability distribution of the events more intuitively. With PDEL, a probabilistic epistemic model is established for the Monty Hall problem, which can clearly show the probability of winning the car with and without changing the door, and fully demonstrate the changes of the probabilistic epistemic model of the Monty Hall problem under the probability product update rule, therefore, help us to understand the Monty Hall problem with a holistic perspective.
2021 Vol. 14 (5): 23-33 [Abstract] ( 4 ) [HTML 1KB] [ PDF 311KB] ( 48 )
34 On Hegel’s Subjectpredicate Theory and its “Inversion” Problem
Changfu Xu
Both Feuerbach and Marx accuse Hegel of inversing the subject and the predicate, but the reality is much more complex. Hegel’s theory of logic is a vast system. In terms of the relationship between the subject and the predicate alone, there is a systematic theory that is centered on the relationship between the universality, particularity and individuality of concepts and that contains four major types of judgement. And there is no assertion featuring the subjectpredicate inversion in a logically clear form within Hegel’s system. Nevertheless, the whole philosophy of Hegel aims at grasping das Absolute, the rationalized form of the Christian God, by deducing concepts. On the one hand, “das Absolute” means precisely “the absolute”, i.e., something absolute, and since it is unique in Hegel’s
sense, Hegel takes it as the ultimate subject of all philosophical propositions, and regards all logical categories and actual things as predicates which it employs to express, explain and actualize itself. In this regard, there is at least no inversion in the form. On the other hand, with regard to the content, das Absolute is the ultimate subject, that is, the least clear concept, and all other concepts are clearer than it, so they are its predicates. At the same time, it potentially contains the greatest universality, and all other concepts are its unfolding particularity; in this sense it can be considered the most abstract, and all other concepts are more concrete than it. Even “Being (Sein)”, defined by Hegel as its initial predicate, is less abstract than it; hence only in this respect Hegel makes the mistake
of inversing the subject and the predicate. Further, on the premise that “das Absolute” is the subject of all concepts, Hegel’s deduction of philosophical propositions, starting with “Being”, moves from the abstract to the concrete at every step. And it can be argued that he consistently takes the more abstract concepts as subjects and the more concrete concepts as predicates. Therefore, a reasonable accusation of Hegel’s subjectpredicate inversion should be generally confined to this.
2021 Vol. 14 (5): 34-55 [Abstract] ( 2 ) [HTML 1KB] [ PDF 402KB] ( 10 )
56 Necessity of Identity, Rigid Designation, and Causal Chain
Yetao Liu; Siping Yang
Among contemporary debate of identity, Kripke’s theory of necessity of identity has shown multiple connections in logic and philosophy, and drawn important consequences in the domain of meaning and truth. Theorem of necessity of identity can be proven in classical logic. Philosophical explanation for necessity of identity is based on Kripke’s demarcation for necessity being in the domain of metaphysics, and his intentional emphasis for ontological viewpoint. Once logical forms of “is” type sentences are revealed, ontological implication of rigid designation can be discovered, which is just an expression for the state of affair of selfidentity of entities. It can be shown by a contrast between logical necessity and nonlogical necessity that Kripke’s theory of necessity of identity is not compatible with his account on causal chain, and the former cannot give the requisite elements of epistemology for constructing a complete reference theory.
2021 Vol. 14 (5): 56-69 [Abstract] ( 1 ) [HTML 1KB] [ PDF 297KB] ( 26 )
70 Are Wide-Scope Descriptions Rigid Designators? —Comments on the Defense of Wide-ScopeDescriptions for Descriptivism
Jisheng Chen; Jing Zhang
Kripke demonstrates that names are rigid designators and descriptions (not containing the descriptions which describe essential properties of objects) are not rigid designators by modal argument, which strikes the classical descriptivist theory of names seriously. Some firm descriptivists think that wide-scope interpretation of descriptions in modal context can represent rigidity. Kripke criticizes the theory of wide-scope descriptions, Sosa and Chen response Kripke resolutely. There are a few points worth discussing in the defensive work of Sosa and Chen, and the theory of wide-scope descriptions has deviated from the classical descriptivist theory of names.
2021 Vol. 14 (5): 70-85 [Abstract] ( 3 ) [HTML 1KB] [ PDF 291KB] ( 17 )
86 Three Connotations of Translation of “Logic” by Yanfu: Politics, Knowledge, Science and Art
Jin Gan
Yanfu chose Mingxue 名学instead of Bianxue 辩/辨学, Lunlixue 论理学and Minglitan 名理探to translate logic. Mingxue was not created by Yanfu, but he was the
first man to use it to translate logic. The reason that Yanfu prefered Mingxue is that Mingxue has three connotations of politics, knowledge, science and art.In connotations of politics,knowledge, science and art, Mingxue can be the foundation of national governance, the study of a certain subject,science and art respectively.
2021 Vol. 14 (5): 86-96 [Abstract] ( 4 ) [HTML 1KB] [ PDF 265KB] ( 22 )
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